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Paranoia:  Contested and contextualised    
 
 
In this chapter we discuss how paranoia might best be conceptualised and responded to. By 
paranoia we mean experiences of perceiving and relating to others that are characterised by 
suspicion, mistrust or hostility. Whilst such experiences are common in the general 
population, amongst people who receive clinical interventions they often include complex, 
self-insulating belief systems, distorted perceptions and marked distress. In psychiatry these 
experiences are usually associated with diagnoses of schizophrenia, delusional disorder and 
paranoid personality disorder. The problems with the reliability and validity of these 
diagnostic categories are well known (Bentall, 2004; Boyle, 2002; Pilgrim, 2001). One 
alternative approach is to focus on specific problematic experiences and behaviours (Boyle, 
2002) or ‘complaints’ (Bentall (2004) rather than heterogeneous diagnostic categories. Doing 
so addresses the problem of heterogeneity – but how might we then conceptualise these 
experiences?  Drawing on a discussion of Bleuler’s notion of schizophrenia, we present an 
approach to paranoia that considers both its social context and its embodied character. We 
then investigate the notion of ‘distress’. Given the well-established finding that many people 
have experiences similar in content to those of mental health service users but without any 
accompanying distress, we discuss the importance of context in the generation of distress – 
in particular how it may arise because of a lack of ‘fit’ in the way they negotiate their beliefs 
and unusual experiences with their social world. Finally, we discuss how one might offer help 
or support differently in relation to paranoia. 
 
  
Conceptualising paranoia 
 
Clinicians might usefully reflect upon what paranoia is, because how they conceptualise it 
will influence the interventions they offer. In recent writings we have proposed that paranoia 
can be understood as constituted most crucially from complex mixtures of feelings (Cromby 
& Harper, 2009). By feelings we mean embodied states that can be subjectively 
experienced: emotions fall into this category, as do states like pain and fatigue, alongside 
more subtle states such as ‘feeling certain’. These states constantly reflect our social and 
material situation and are the basis of all of our more formal thought processes (Langer, 
1967). 
 
Here, we introduce this approach, contrasting it with one of the foundational accounts of 
schizophrenia: Eugene Bleuler’s work, which also gave a prominent role to feelings. We are 
cautious not to over-extend this comparison, partly because interpretations even across 
such relatively short periods of historical time are fraught, and partly because there is 
evidence that the population studied by Bleuler (and Kraepelin, the other architect of 
schizophrenia) was fundamentally different from today’s. Substantial numbers of these early 
patients probably suffered from undiagnosed encephalitis lethargica, the symptoms of which 
(e.g. cyanosis, disorders of balance and gait, tremors) were also recorded as symptoms of 
schizophrenia but which (excluding the Parkinsonian effects of medication) are rarely, if 
ever, seen today (Boyle, 2002). We also recognise that in examining Bleuler’s concept we 
might appear to give it further legitimacy by reifying schizophrenia. However, many concepts 
in psychiatry are of this nature – reified categories that have become separated from the 
experiences they were originally designed to understand. Moreover, Bleuler’s work is still 
cited by psychiatric textbooks to legitimate the schizophrenia diagnosis (e.g. Burton, 2006) 
and continues to inform research (Andreasen, 2000; Kraus & Keefe, 2007; Park & Thakkar, 
2010). So it is both timely and appropriate to revisit Bleuler; having done so, we describe 
some differences between his account and ours, then identify some clinical implications of 
our discussion. 
 
2 
 
 
The Disease of Schizophrenia 
 
The invention of schizophrenia is a seminal moment in the history of psychiatry, and the 
basics of the story are well known. In 1896 Emil Kraepelin claimed to have identified a 
subset of patients who shared similarities in the onset, course and outcome of their 
difficulties. He argued that these patients were reliably distinguishable from others (for 
example, those he described as having manic-depressive disorders) and concluded that all 
had the same disease, dementia praecox. Subsequently, Bleuler gave this disease its 
modern name: schizophrenia. The new name reflected two major differences from 
Kraepelin’s conception. First, Bleuler’s observation that – unlike in dementia – outcomes 
were not always negative, and deterioration was not inevitable and irreversible. Second, his 
view that the core symptom of this disease was a ‘loosening of associations’ between the 
various elements of thought, a ‘weakening’ of mental energy. 
 
For Bleuler, this loosening or weakening causes a shattering of the psyche – a ‘split mind’. 
The usual processes that link thinking, feeling, memory, identity and perception, enabling 
them to work together seamlessly, are pathologically impaired: consequently, these 
functions get dissociated or disconnected from each other. Bleuler describes how the 
product of this splitting is an excess of feeling that then gets associated in a relatively fixed 
way with a particular idea – an ‘idea complex’ – but that “behind this systematic splitting into 
definite idea-complexes, we have found a previous primary loosening of the associational 
structure which can lead to an irregular fragmentation of such solidly established elements 
as concrete ideas.” (Bleuler 1950, p.362). Schizophrenia, then, impairs the usual power of 
rational thought to inhibit, control and regulate affect: “What is pathological in the organic 
psychoses, so far as the feelings are concerned, is that they dominate the thoughts more 
strongly than in healthy individuals. Their inhibitory and helping influence on associations is 
rendered stronger by the faultiness of intellectual function.” (Bleuler, 1912 p.34). 
 
Historically, at least, this is the sense in which schizophrenia is portrayed primarily as a 
cognitive disorder, a disease of thought. A weakening of cognitive processes, caused by an 
organic impairment, is seen as the fundamental cause of schizophrenia. The subsequent 
imbalance of thinking and feeling (for Bleuler, disorders of affect, autism and ambivalence), 
along with delusions and hallucinations, are merely derivative or secondary symptoms. As 
Andreasen (2000, p.107) puts it “For both Kraepelin and Bleuler, the most important defining 
feature was an impairment in the ability to think in a clear, fluent and logical way”. To 
summarise, then: Bleuler proposed that in schizophrenia, an organic deficit impairs the 
ability to think. This causes an excess of feeling, which allows idea complexes to form; these 
idea-complexes are the basis of the delusions and hallucinations often associated with the 
diagnosis. 
 
This very brief account of Bleuler’s concept of schizophrenia allows us to make comparisons 
and contrasts with recent work of our own (Cromby & Harper, 2009). We have argued that 
experiences of paranoia for which a person might receive professional help are produced 
when complex mixtures of socialised feeling produce very high states of arousal. When a 
person is highly aroused in this way, perceptions – which are usually simply tinged by 
feelings – can become powerfully influenced by them. Proximally, these states of heightened 
arousal may happen as a consequence of feeling traps (Scheff, 2003): arrangements of 
social, relational and material circumstances which induce complex mixtures of feelings. This 
can cause the feelings involved to sustain, intensify and generalise, making it harder for the 
person to interpret or understand them or to recognise their origins or causes, and so – in 
turn – producing additional feelings of anxiety, confusion or excitement that further 
complicate the person’s experience.  
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Scheff proposes that, because of its specific qualities, shame will often be a component of 
feeling traps. He also discusses evidence suggesting that experiences of shame are 
frequently ‘disavowed’ – that is, people simply avoid recognising them. Shame itself is 
shameful, and the feelings associated with it are highly toxic; as a consequence, people 
frequently avoid all reference to their own experiences of shame and try to act as though 
they did not happen (Lewis, 1971). Whilst for any specific individual very many different 
feelings might be involved, shame is frequently discussed in relation to paranoia, and our 
reading of the literature suggests that shame, fear and anger might all typically be important. 
 
In paranoia, then, fear might cause shame (in men, for example, because of normative 
gender expectations); this in turn could lead to anger, especially if the shame is disavowed; 
and this anger could be frightening, so magnifying the initial state of fear. Importantly, 
though, this is a schematic summary: at every moment, the precise way such feeling 
dynamics are enacted will continuously be influenced by fluctuating social and material 
circumstances. Feelings also influence - and are reciprocally influenced by - the narratives 
we tell others and ourselves, the ‘inner speech’ we experience, and the discursive 
constructions of world and self that, in everyday life, we constantly construct, update and 
revise. In paranoia these narratives are often conspiratorial and may refer to security 
services, aliens, secret organisations, surveillance and military technologies, or obscure or 
extreme religious or political groups. 
 
Paranoia is likely to be characterised both by complex, shifting mixtures of feeling and by 
obstacles to their interpretation: where people believe they are not allowed to have or 
express certain feelings; where having or being seen to have certain feelings is dangerous; 
where it is adaptive not to feel, or at least appear not to feel; where feelings are difficult to 
identify or acknowledge because they run counter to the expectations or strictures of 
powerful others, and so on. In such circumstances, personal narratives may become 
somewhat complex and convoluted, occasionally lacking in overt logical coherence whilst 
retaining a deeper metaphorical or affective structure. Some of the typical features of the 
narratives of people experiencing distressing forms of paranoia – rapid speech, and an 
obsessive concentration on particular themes – are often associated with the presence of 
disavowed feelings (Scheff, 2003), suggesting that these may be particularly important. 
Moreover, the well-documented associations between paranoia, poor attachment, 
victimisation, powerlessness and marginalisation mean that paranoid narratives may often 
be managing some degree of exclusion or disenfranchisement: consequently, they may 
frequently serve a compensatory function that would (if accurate) endow the speaker with 
arcane knowledge or privileged insight (Bentall 2004; Cromby & Harper 2009). 
 
 
Beyond Notions of Disease 
 
So there are similarities between our account and Bleuler’s, since both are concerned with 
the relations between thinking and feeling, but there are also differences. Most 
fundamentally, Bleuler is explaining a putative disease, schizophrenia, whereas our aim is to 
understand an experience; consequently, our account is not confined to a single diagnostic 
category and recognises that paranoia is associated with numerous diagnoses (and with no 
diagnosis at all). Also, by comparison to our notion of feeling, Bleuler’s conceptualisation of 
affect is on balance narrower, more sharply distinguished from cognition, and more 
interchangeable with emotion. But there are also other differences, and we will now explore 
three that are especially significant. 
 
First, our account does not presuppose an organic impairment which gives rise to a cognitive 
deficit. Since Bleuler proposed this, more than a hundred years of generously funded 
research, using ever more sophisticated technologies, has failed to find consistent evidence 
for any such pathology. As eminent biological psychiatrist Kenneth Kendler (2005, p.434-5) 
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puts it: “We have hunted for big, simple, neuropathological explanations for psychiatric 
disorders and have not found them. We have hunted for big, simple, neurochemical 
explanations for psychiatric disorders and have not found them. We have hunted for big, 
simple genetic explanations for psychiatric disorders, and have not found them.” Importantly, 
though, whilst our account does not presume an organic deficit, nor does it ignore the body, 
as social science and cognitive psychology so often do: instead, we emphasise embodied 
feelings as the medium through which paranoia is primarily constituted. 
 
Second, Bleuler’s account posits an imbalance between thinking and feeling, arising as a 
consequence of weakened cognitive function. However, not only is the organic impairment 
purported to cause this initial weakening still elusive, we also question whether there can 
actually be an ‘imbalance’ of this kind. There is a contemporary movement within the 
humanities and social sciences known as the ‘affective turn’ (e.g. Athanasiou, Hantzaroula, 
& Yannakopoulos, 2008; Clough & Halley, 2007). Whilst the diversity of this work is such that 
even the basic terms affect, emotion and feeling are disputed, scholars associated with this 
movement agree that affective phenomena are hugely significant in human life; cannot 
sensibly be reduced to language, discourse or representation; and, conversely, cannot 
simply be treated as separable biological causes. From the perspective of the affective turn, 
no cognition is free of affect. Every thought is simultaneously both a movement of feeling 
and an associated fragment of inner speech that, to borrow Vygotsky’s terminology, 
‘completes’ it, making it fully sensible and available for reflection upon by ourselves, and (if 
we speak it aloud) by others (Cromby, 2007; Johnson, 2007; Vygotsky, 1962). 
 
Frequently, the experiences associated with psychiatric diagnoses get related to neural 
structures and processes. Notwithstanding the well-documented dangers of individualism, 
reductionism and reification of diagnostic categories associated with such inferences 
(Bennett & Hacker, 2003), neuroscience itself provides evidence suggesting that thinking 
and feeling are not actually separable. Panksepp’s (1998) studies of the mammalian brain 
identify a set of evolutionary older affect structures that he calls ‘basic operating system 
circuits’ that, once engaged, set the imperative and tone of cognitive processing. Similarly, 
Damasio (1999) proposes that feelings – feedback from the body – are the raw stuff of 
consciousness itself, which he suggests is generated in pulses that consist of the difference 
between the body in one somatic state and then, momentarily later, in another. Both of these 
neuroscientists (and others e.g. Le Doux, 1999) provide arguments and evidence indicating 
that thinking and feeling are always thoroughly intertwined. On the basis of this evidence, all 
thinking – whether or not it is associated with mental health difficulties - is already felt 
thinking. 
 
This evidence suggests that, rather than being capable of getting stuck in a state of 
imbalance, feeling and thinking are in a continuous, dialectical relation, each with the other. 
Additionally, both are constantly open to external influence, so experiences of paranoia ebb 
and flow according to circumstance and situation. Even during intensely distressing episodes 
(so-called florid paranoia), when sustained, complex mixtures of feeling have temporarily 
generated highly aroused states, it does not seem that thinking somehow stops: on the 
contrary, individuals continue to generate narratives by which to understand their 
experience. These narratives may become rapid (so called ‘pressure of speech’) as the 
person strives to keep toxic feelings out of awareness (cf. Scheff, 2003). They may become 
disjointed as the person struggles to make sense of their multiple, fluctuating feelings and 
the fragments of meaning they are able to attach to them (so-called ‘thought disorder’). 
Likewise, their logic – reflecting the complex, mobile, partially unspeakable mix of feelings 
within it – may defy some everyday conventions whilst entirely according with others, and 
indeed whilst reflecting in important ways the events, people and circumstances with which 
the person is currently preoccupied. But even during these intensely distressing episodes, 
feeling does not simply prevent or overwhelm thinking. In fact, it seems equally plausible to 
suggest that these are experiences where people are thinking too much: one way of 
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understanding paranoia is to see it as a determined search for meanings and significances 
where none may actually exist. 
 
A third difference between Bleuler’s account and ours is that we do not see the origin of 
paranoia as a cognitive deficit within the individual. Instead, we propose that toxic social and 
material circumstances combine to produce feeling traps which position individuals in ways 
that engender self-amplifying mixtures of shame, fear, anger and other feelings, mixtures 
that - if they persist - can induce extreme levels of arousal. Arguably, Bleuler’s view that 
paranoia (at least in association with diagnoses of schizophrenia) is caused by individual 
cognitive deficits is mirrored by recent innovations in clinical psychology which emphasise 
the role of cognitive processes (e.g. attentional biases and jumping to conclusions) in 
producing experiences such as voice-hearing and delusional beliefs (Bentall, Corcoran, 
Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001; Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994). This work is 
a valuable advance upon Bleuler’s because it emphasises experiences that can be identified 
relatively reliably, rather than being dependent upon unreliable diagnostic categories, and 
also because it is associated with psychological rather than pharmaceutical interventions. 
Nevertheless, it is conceptually similar in that it posits a cognitive disorder as the root cause 
of these problems. 
 
By contrast, we propose that the cause of intrensely distressing episodes of paranoia is not 
an individual disorder or deficit, whether cognitive or organic, but a set of circumstances in 
the world itself. By virtue of their immersion in environments, individuals acquire habits of 
feeling, alongside habits of making sense both of their feelings and of the circumstances 
which generated them. If acquired in toxic circumstances, or alternately if acquired in benign 
environments but subsequently transferred to toxic ones, these habits may themselves 
become unhelpful. But even where this occurs, the origin of these habits is the social and 
material circumstances which gave rise to them, not some intrinsic cognitive flaw. As Jacqui 
Dillon, chair of the UK Hearing Voices Network puts it “instead of asking people – what is 
wrong with you?  We ask people – what has happened to you?” (2011, p.155). 
 
So it is not necessarily that these habits of thinking and feeling are themselves unhelpful, so 
much as that their ‘goodness of fit’ with the situations within which they are now enacted is 
not optimal. Strikingly, however, this issue of fit is rarely discussed, even though the context 
of experience is hugely influential on whether distress is associated with it. 
 
 
Context, ‘fit’ and paranoia 
 
One of the problems facing clinicians is that the vast majority of people they see because of 
paranoia are either in distress themselves or causing distress to others. Consequently, they 
might fall prey to the clinician’s fallacy: the assumption that unusual experiences are 
necessarily associated with distress. A number of studies challenge this assumption, notably 
those using the PDI (Peters et al Delusions Inventory), a self-report questionnaire which 
asks questions about beliefs drawn from schedules of psychiatric symptoms but uses 
everyday rather than psychiatric language. Items include questions like ‘do you ever feel as 
if people seem to drop hints about you or say things with a double meaning?’ and ‘do you 
ever feel as if you are being persecuted in some way?’.  The PDI provides a total score – the 
number of unusual beliefs the person is said to hold -- and, for each belief, ratings of the 
conviction with which it is held, the level of preoccupation the person has with the belief, and 
the level of distress they feel it causes. Whilst this method takes a cognitive approach to 
beliefs (which can themselves be seen as both structures of feeling and components of 
thinking - Cromby, in press), it nevertheless provides a useful perspective. Peters, et al 
(2004), using a 21 item version of the PDI, compared the scores of a large general 
population sample with the scores of people who were psychiatric patients and diagnosed as 
having delusions.  The authors used the shorthand labels of ‘healthy’ and ‘deluded’ for the 
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two samples.  In figure 1 we can see how many beliefs were held by people in each of the 
samples.   If we look at the general population (‘healthy’) sample we can see that relatively 
few people endorsed none of the beliefs – indeed, the vast majority of this sample endorsed 
at least some of the beliefs. The authors reported that the difference between the two 
samples  was not the existence of unusual beliefs per se but the levels of conviction, 
preoccupation and distress associated with them. Another study compared members of New 
Religious Movements (NRMs: Druids and Hare Krishnas), non-religious people, Christians 
and ‘deluded people’ (their term for the same in-patient sample), and reported no differences 
between NRMs and ‘deluded people’ in numbers of beliefs or the conviction with which they 
were held. Rather, the key differences were in the preoccupation and distress associated 
with them (Peters et al, 1999). 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
In the Netherlands, van Os, et al (2000) conducted a survey of 7,076 Dutch people from the 
general population using a structured interview schedule with follow-up telephone interviews 
by psychiatrists for anyone where there was at least one rating on an item relating to 
psychosis. They reported that 3.3% had ‘true’ delusions (i.e. beliefs which met the diagnostic 
criteria for delusional belief), whilst an additional 8.7% had delusions that were ‘not clinically 
relevant’ – that is, they were ‘not bothered by it and not seeking help for it’ (van Os, et al., 
2000, p.13). This raises the intriguing possibility that, in addition to mental health service 
users, there may be twice that number of people in the wider population who have unusual 
experiences or beliefs, but who are not in distress or causing distress to others, and are 
living outwardly conventional everyday lives. 
 
Whilst it can be hard for us to fully accept this, there are numerous accounts of people living 
with extraordinary experiences (Romme, Escher, Dillon, Corstens & Morris, 2009). There are 
also high-profile people who might not have been given psychiatric diagnoses who live 
apparently functional lives, who do not appear to have either experienced distress because 
of their beliefs or to have received mental health services. Harper (2011a) discusses Sun Ra 
(a black American avant garde jazz musician) and David Icke: here, we will briefly consider 
David Icke’s views. 
 
Icke was a professional footballer who became a BBC TV sports presenter in the 1980s. He 
was involved in the Green Party in the late 1980s, but parted company with them following a 
number of spiritual experiences. A week after resigning from the Green Party he held a 
press conference to announce that he had become a "channel for the Christ spirit” and 
predicted that the world would end in 1997 after a series of natural disasters. Icke 
subsequently began wearing only turquoise because he considered it a conduit of positive 
energy. Although the audience on Terry Wogan’s  BBC chat show appeared to laugh when 
they heard his views, according to journalist Jon Ronson Icke is ‘a global sensation’ who 
“lectures to packed houses all over the world, riveting his audiences for six hours at a time 
with extraordinary revelations” (Ronson, 2001, p.151). He has a website 
(www.davidicke.com) which announced a second live date at the O2 Brixton academy in 
London in September 2010 to meet excess demand following a previous sell-out lecture in 
May 2010, and has written numerous books about his ideas, in particular that the world is 
run by a race of shape-shifting alien lizards who have inter-bred with humans. 
 
Thus it would seem that unusual beliefs, or experiences like hearing voices and seeing 
visions, are not necessarily associated with distress: other kinds of feelings can be 
implicated. Indeed, the category of eccentric is frequently ascribed to those who are open 
about these experiences (Weeks & James, 1997). Whilst people are usually described as 
eccentric when their views are idiosyncratic, sometimes whole groups of people profess 
beliefs that many consider unusual. Shaw (1995) describes his experiences with a number 
of new religious groups, including the Aetherius Society which believes that their founder 
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was in telepathic communication with UFOs. Of course, particularly when discussing 
religious, philosophical, political or moral claims, assertions about whether a belief is unusual 
can be problematic (Harper, 2011a). It seems that it is the fit between particular beliefs and 
experiences and other aspects of people’s lives that powerfully influences whether distress 
(their own, or that of others) is associated with them. 
 
 
Clinical Implications 
 
We have suggested that intensely distressing episodes of paranoia should be seen as habits 
of felt thinking and action acquired in response to events in the social world.  We have also 
argued that it is the context of beliefs and experiences and their ‘fit’ in a person’s life which 
may be important in determining whether they might cause problems for them.  How might 
these observations be of use to those and those seeking to help people referred to mental 
health services?  Firstly, it is important to consider the wider context within which distress is 
identified (for either the person or others). Secondly, it is important to consider how the 
person’s biographical context may give metaphorical meaning to the belief or experience, 
since this may suggest how habits of felt thinking and action are linked to prior adverse 
experiences. 
 
Wider context 
 
It is important not to assume the experience or belief is necessarily distressing. One needs 
to consider the source of the referral: did it come from the person, a relative, or an agency as 
a result of requests by neighbours etc?  If the person is not in distress then maybe, rather 
than trying to change the person’s relationship with their experience (e.g. through trying to 
alter their appraisal of it), what may be needed is help with relating that experience to the 
wider world, devising practical strategies to manage and negotiate their feelings in a world 
which may find them disturbing. There could be a range of tacit skills deployed by those in 
the general population with similar experiences – for example, people might carefully 
consider those with whom to discuss their unusual beliefs. 
 
If the person is not distressed it may help to direct them to groups who share similar beliefs 
or experiences, since social isolation seems to accentuate distress (Read & Bentall, in 
press).These groups may also offer protocols, practices and rituals which enable even a 
person preoccupied with a belief to set it in a context, reducing its immediacy and personal 
salience by sharing with the group, and locating it within a narrative with broader meanings. 
Thus, Hearing Voices Network groups embrace an agnostic approach to causality, enabling 
people to develop their own conceptual frameworks.  Similarly, UFO abduction groups have 
developed complex belief systems setting these experiences in a wider historical and 
cultural context of the possibilities of human-alien communication (Clancy, 2005).     
 
If the person themselves is not distressed by their experience or belief, but their family (for 
example) are disturbed or concerned, it may help to closely examine how this concern 
arises. It may be that simply talking to their family less about their beliefs and/or experiences 
will be helpful. Indeed, this is a common strategy deployed by those in hospital who wish to 
be discharged (Dillon, 2011). Frequently, a person’s ability to talk less to those close to them 
is facilitated by engagement with a group – like those mentioned above – where experiences 
can be freely discussed. 
 
Equally, it is important not to assume that these experiences or beliefs aren’t distressing.  
Indeed, it is easy to romanticise those who hold beliefs which are seen as unusual as 
cognitive dissidents, to view their experiences in solely libertarian terms. If the person is 
distressed it is still important to investigate the context in which these feelings arise, though. 
Is it the belief or experience per se, the nature of their relationship with it, or the way they 
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negotiate it with the wider world?  It may help to clarify criteria by which the person would 
judge whether their relationship with -- and negotiation of -- the belief or experience had 
improved. Following Michael White’s approach to helping service users clarify their position 
in relation to psychiatric medication (Stewart, 1995), therapists could consider how they 
might help service users determine whether their relationship with their beliefs contributes to 
-- or subtracts from -- their quality of life, ways in which their beliefs might be enabling and 
disabling, and how their effects (on themselves, and others) might best be monitored. 
 
 
Biographical context 
 
It may also help to explore the metaphorical meaning of a person’s feelings in relation to 
their biography – for example, does it convey something about how they have made sense 
of aversive events earlier in life?  Read and Bentall (in press) provide various examples of 
such links from the mental health literature, including this from Heins et al (1990): 
 
A woman, who had been sexually assaulted by her father from a very young age and 
raped as a teenager, had the delusion that ‘people were watching her as they 
thought she was a sexual pervert and auditory hallucinations accusing her of doing 
“dirty sexy things”’ (cited in Read & Bentall, in press) 
 
Of course, such explorations need to be conducted in a therapeutically safe and containing 
manner, setting problematic feelings in a meaningful context.   
 
Even if a service user does not wish or is not able to leave their belief behind, it may be 
important to discuss how they might revise their relationship with it or its role in their life.  
Recently, cognitive behavioural approaches have begun to move in this direction, particularly 
concerning beliefs which seem hard to shift. Tamasin Knight, who received Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy but did not find that approach a good fit for her, explains how this kind 
of revision might occur: 
 
Some years ago I became very distressed as I believed I had a physical 
illness that would kill me in the not too distant future. I later became able to cope with 
this by thinking that if this was the case, then I should do the things I felt were 
important and enjoyed right away, rather than leave them to the future. By getting 
involved in activities I felt were important and worthwhile and building up my social 
network, the unpleasant beliefs I experienced became less central and troublesome 
in my life. 
        Knight (2004, p.13) 
 
This is a pragmatic approach, focusing on a person’s life goals rather than whether their 
beliefs are true. Given that final and convincing proof in relation to some beliefs may be 
impossible to acquire, the question becomes:  how do we move forward?  This might involve 
activities with which the person wishes to be involved but which fear has prevented. Such 
involvement might increase self-confidence and reduce social isolation, both factors which 
appear to be implicated in the development of unusual beliefs and experiences (Read & 
Bentall, in press). In the next section we discuss a range of interventions which are 
consistent with the approach we have outlined. 
 
 
Alternative interventions 
 
Interventions from a range of theoretical traditions would be consistent with our approach.  
However, given the dominance of individual psychotherapeutic approaches and the relative 
neglect of a more collective and contextualised approach, here we will focus mainly on 
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interventions with groups and wider networks. We will begin by focusing on the Hearing 
Voices Movement, as it has led the way in developing collective, alternatives but we will then 
look at paranoia self help groups, the Open Dialogue approach and, finally, community 
psychology.  Following reports that many in the general population heard voices, the Hearing 
Voices Movement attempted to de-pathologise this experience. In the UK, the Hearing 
Voices Network follows this approach, welcoming a diversity of causal explanations, and 
voice hearers are encouraged to find their own ways of understanding and managing their 
experiences (Romme et al., 2009). Often this involves meeting with others who have similar 
experiences.  How might such groups be helpful?  One important factor may be that they 
help people develop explanations for their experiences which make sense to them and fit 
with the way they and others see the world. Of course, some explanations may be 
distressing, so groups might also help people to develop explanations which do not unduly 
distress them. Groups may also put people  in contact with communities of others who share 
similar meanings – for example, Spiritualist church groups which see voices as having 
religious significance: this can help reduce social isolation. In addition, groups often engage 
in routine collective activities which ground the person in a community, for example the 
regular meetings of Hearing Voices groups or the rituals and services of religious groups 
(Clarke, 2010). 
 
In recent years, these insights have led to the development of paranoia support groups 
(Bullimore, 2010; James, 2003).  Knight (2009) describes the process of setting up the 
‘Better believe it!’ support group at the Joan of Arc project in Exeter and also includes the 
findings of an evaluation after the group had been meeting for two years. The founding 
conference of the Paranoia Network in Manchester in 2004 was attended by over 100 
people; accounts of it can be found in Hornstein (2009) and Jacobson and Zavos (2007), 
whilst the Romme et al (2009) volume includes accounts by some of the presenters. 
 
The family is an important social context for some service users but, a continual challenge in 
psychotherapeutic work is to avoid colonising service users’ experience with a monological 
interpretation (e.g. biomedical, cognitive etc). Seikkula, Alakare and Aaltonen’s (2001a,b) 
‘Open Dialogue’ approach explicitly involves the elaboration of multiple perspectives on 
distress, utilising the reflecting team tradition within systemic therapy. Here a small team of 
professionals meet with service users and their families with the specific aim of generating a 
range of explanations in a safe and containing manner, with the aim of placing problematic 
feelings in a meaningful context, rather than simply offering one explanation and one 
treatment.  
 
Community psychology is another approach to engaging with the social context. May (2007) 
has discussed the development of community-based approaches for people having 
experiences considered psychotic – for example the work of Evolving Minds in Yorkshire 
(http://www.evolving-minds.co.uk/). Holland’s (1991) White City project is also a useful 
model. Holland adopted a social action psychotherapy approach focused on women in West 
London’s White City area, offered sessions of individual therapy which led into group work 
and then into collective social action. Holmes’ (2010) approach to group work draws on 
Holland’s approach. Narrative therapists offer another approach to working with communities 
and groups (e.g.Freedman & Combs, 2009). One issue which is often neglected is the need 
for societal changes, since environments are consistently shown to be strong causal factors 
in the development and maintenance of distress. Consequently, policy recommendations 
also flow from our approach, and these may become especially important in a so-called ‘Age 
of Austerity’ that seems likely to fuel increased social fragmentation and decreased trust in 
communities (Harper, 2011a,b). 
 
 
Conclusion 
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Paranoia, like other terms used to describe mental health difficulties, is contested. In this 
chapter, we have tried to show how this term need not be understood in the context of a 
disease. Instead, we have argued, paranoia can be understood in the multiple contexts of 
everyday life and the unique contexts of personal biographies. This understanding of 
paranoia begins to distance it from the stigma that is inevitably associated with biomedical 
explanations for such experiences. It directs our attention to social and material 
circumstances, to the fit between beliefs, experiences and their contexts; it also directs our 
attention to personal biographies, and the habits of feeling they produce. Various research 
questions flow from our approach, and we have elaborated these elsewhere (Cromby & 
Harper, 2009). Here, we have explored some ways in which clinicians might help people 
who experience paranoia, and examined some of the ways in which people who experience 
paranoia are already helping themselves. However, since paranoia is a socially and 
materially constituted embodied experience, a way of being in the world, it necessarily 
reflects the circumstances and contingencies of that world. Consequently, its amelioration 
will always be a matter of political, economic and social policy, as well as therapeutic 
intervention. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Range of scores and distributions of PDI Yes/No scores in the “healthy” 
and “deluded” groups (Peters et al, 2004) 
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